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Abstract
In light of the rising importance of the financial services industry, this study aimed to
examine the applicability of Michael E. Porter's "cluster"theory to the analysis of the
concentration and agglomeration tendencies of the financial services industry. This
stems from the fact that most of the other regional economic theories have been
developed in the context of the manufacturing industry, which has several inherent
differences from the financial services industries. With the Boston mutual fund
industry as the case study, this paper also attempts to determine the importance of
history for the industry's success. Under Porter's (1990) cluster framework, the role
of history is acknowledged, but deems that with good selective government policies, a
"cluster", which is a group of industries linked together by supplier or customer or
other forms of relationship, can be created. This paper argues that history is vital for
the successful development of the mutual fund industry, and it cannot be created
through the implementation of appropriate policies alone.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The most traditional economists have paid little attention to geography. However,
many economists observed that there seems to be some pattern of industrial
agglomeration and location. For example, the automobile industry is largely
concentrated in Detroit, the aerospace industry in Los Angeles, and the jewelry
industry in Providence (Porter, 1998). In their attempt to explain such behavioural
phenomena of inter-firm collective gravitation, different regional economists and
analysts have proposed different theories of economic agglomeration.
Many of these models in regional economics were developed during the age of
industrialization, an era when manufacturing industries were the main engines of
economic growth, and were perceived to be the key to long-term economic well-
being. Consequently, most of these regional economic theories were modeled with
the manufacturing industry in consideration. Although the manufacturing sector is
still a major contributor to economic expansion, the importance of the service sector,
especially the financial services sector, is clearly rising.
Today's financial services sector encompass much more than just the traditional
banking activities; stock brokerage, bond transactions, mutual funds activities, and
many other forms of derivatives trading, are some that one might find in the deep
jungles of the financial markets. The main reason for such increasing significance is
that as an intermediary agent, the financial services sector provides more flexible
payments mechanisms, loan maturity intermediation, cost-efficient information
processing, and risk diversification than in the past (Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Ferri,
1997.) All these activities help to reduce market frictions and improve resource
allocation by mobilizing savings and lubricating the flow of capital (Levine, 1996).
This is critical for the continuous upgrading of today's manufacturing sector, which is
relying more and more on technology and is becoming increasingly capital intensive.
With the growing importance of the financial services industry, it is sensible to re-
examine the regional economic theories in the light of the financial services industry,
which has also exhibited industrial-agglomeration tendencies. I have chosen the
Boston mutual fund industry to be my supporting case study. The reasons for my
choice are simple. Boston has considerable concentration of mutual fund
management companies. It is also the place where the first mutual fund in the Unites
States was born. Additionally, the mutual funds industry not only is already a
significant player in the US financial landscape, but it is still rapidly growing, with
continuous product and service innovations.
In this thesis, I shall first choose from the various regional economic models, the most
suitable framework to use to explain industrial agglomeration and location, in the
context of financial services industries. Here, I have determined that Michael Porter's
"cluster" theory is the most applicable regional economics model, for reasons I shall
provide in the next section. Using the Porter framework, I shall examine the
determinants of competitive advantage of the mutual fund industry, identify their
presence/absence in Boston, and conduct comparisons between Boston and New
York. Being the nation's financial hub, it is interesting to ponder why New York City
does not have the size nor the degree of concentration of the mutual fund industry that
Boston has. Therefore, the ultimate test of appropriateness of the Porter framework,
in the context of the financial services industry, would be to see if it is able to explain
the abovementioned phenomenon. To this effect, I shall also explore the influence of
history on the development of the mutual fund industry in Boston. Finally, I shall
attempt to draw some policy implications from my findings.
CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In order to choose the most appropriate regional economic theory to apply to the
financial services sector, I first considered the ways in which a financial industry
differs from a manufacturing industry. Then, I consider the variables and underlying
assumptions of the various regional economic theories. Finally, by process of
elimination, I picked the most suitable model to use to analyse the financial industry.
Differences Between Financial Services Industry And Manufacturing Industry
A financial services industry differs from the manufacturing industry in several ways.
While transportation costs incurred in the conveyance of raw materials and final
products are a concern for manufacturers, they are not quite as significant to a
provider of a financial product, such as a mutual fund. Financial products are
basically contracts between the buyers and the sellers. The advancement in
information technology and the digitalization of finance that has led to financial
products taking on an increasingly non-physical form (scriptless), have distorted the
perception of distance. As a consequence, this has also blurred the traditional concept
of boundaries. An investment in a mutual fund would show up as a positive change
in the customer's investment account (usually computerized). In digital form, such a
"purchase" can be sent, just as easily, to a customer who is 10,000 miles away, as it is
to send to another who is just in the neighbourhood.
The most traditional financial products, such as stocks and bonds, do not become
obsolete. Instead, they persist and serve as a base from which new financial products
are created and marketed. As a result, the "make" and "sale" of a financial product,
such as a mutual fund, would involve the products and services of many other sub-
sectors of the financial industry. For instance, just the assemblage of the mutual fund
portfolio would require not only the skills of its portfolio manager, but it would also,
at least, involve the services of data vendors (to provide information on the stocks,
bonds or money market instruments) and brokers (to carry out the manager's orders).
The financial sector is also known to be extremely human capital intensive. Finally,
because buying such metaphysical products, like mutual funds, involves the investors'
savings, reputation has a large influence on the success probability of a financial
services firm, reputation can only be built through repeated dealings and hence,
accumulated trust.
Choosing The Most Suitable Regional Economic Theory
As such, it is possible to eliminate theories that emphasize on distance and
transportation costs as a main determining factor of locational decision of firms, as
with those that have constant technology and low reliance on highly-skilled labour, as
their basic assumptions. This is due to the complication that would be involved in
adjusting for such variables. Central place theory, which is designed to show the
trade-off between economies of scale (from being close to counterparts) and
transportation costs (due to distance between firm and its supplier/customer) that
results in market areas which are nested and hexagonal (Rees, 1986), is clearly
inappropriate to apply to the financial services industry. Even Krugman (1991),
which strives to explain industrial localization and the differential development of
huge regions in the light of a combination of theories, propounded that geographic
concentration is dependent on the interaction of increasing returns to scale,
transportation costs, and demand (Krugman, 1991).
However, there is something that Krugman (1991) brought up which I feel is critical
in analysing the financial services sector -- history. Krugman suggested that there is a
clear accidental component and dependence on history in the locational distribution of
industries. There seems to be a kind of a circular process of historical accident, initial
increasing returns, and rational expectation which culminates into a self-fulfilling
prophecy that reinforces the influence of history on the localization of industries.
This reflects some sentiments of the Porter's cluster theory. The high wages initially
offered in that region helped to propagate the industry. Even when another region
might start to rise and begin to offer competing factors of production, the original
industrial concentration would persist or even continue to thrive, if people expect it to
continue to be better because it had proved itself over the years before (Krugman,
1991). I shall explore this in later sections of this paper.
Although used extensively to examine location of manufacturing firms, the product
cycle theory is also not very suitable to use to analyse the financial services industry.
With an underlying premise of stable technology, long production runs, and a low
reliance on talent and managerial labour, this framework proposes that industries tend
to pass through regular product development cycle -- a period of experimentation, a
period of rapid growth, a period of diminished growth, and a period of stability or
decline. It is the period of rapid growth that is supposed to attract new firms to enter
the new market and locate near the pioneering firm. Product-cycle theorists also
concede that with new products continuing to emerge, the industry will eventually
reach a growth plateau, or decline with obsolescence (Norton and Rees, 1979).
However, continuous technological upgrading has almost become the heart of the
growth of the financial industry, and the reliance on highly-skilled, talented managers
and personnel's has always been the soul of the industry.
Recognizing the some of the shortcomings of the product-cycle framework, theorists
have advanced a similar, yet improved, version of the model -- the profit cycle model.
In this model, the main variable in question is "profits". The theory propounds that
industrial location is dependent on the path of a long-term profit cycle which exhibits
five distinctive stages (Markusen, 1985):
Stage 1: Zero Profit
This corresponds to the initial birth and design stage
of an industry. At this stage, competition is generally
absent or minor, and no entry occurs.
Stage 2: Superprofit
This corresponds to the period of excess profit from
temporary monopoly and innovative edge.
Stage 3: Normal profit
Corresponding to the stage of open entity, movement
toward market saturation and absence of substantial
market place.
Stage 4: Normal-plus or Normal-minus profit
Corresponding to the post-saturation stage, where
either successful oligopolization boosts profits again
or predatory and excessive competition squeezes
profits.
Stage 5: Negative profit
This corresponds to the obsolescence state of the
sector.
The profit cycle proposes that the above would govern the type of activities in each
stage and location decisions would be based on factors that will enhance those
activities For instance, during the second stage, product design, research and
development, is key to the business' success, so firms require highly-skilled labour,
and therefore, locate near the centre of ongoing innovative activity and have better
access to information (Markusen, 1985).
It might seem possible to use this profit cycle theory (the new and improved version
of the product cycle) to analyse the financial sector. It does not place much emphasis
on distance as a variable, and it has adjusted for the imperfect assumptions of the
product cycle. The main variable that influence the location decision of firms in this
theory is profits (Markusen, 1985). At first, it might seem possible to apply this
theory to the financial sector. However, as I have mentioned before, the production
and sale of one financial product involves a whole web of transactions among the
various sub-sectors of the financial sector. This makes the task of unravelling the
entanglement to impute profits a formidable chore.
As an example, consider the "production processes" for mutual funds and low density
polyethylene [Figure 1]. Profitability analysis would be simple to apply to the low
density polyethylene industry, which has a rather linear production process. However,
this would not be the case for the mutual fund industry. Just consider the
"production" of a mutual fund, from assembling the portfolio to putting together a
"sellable" final product, as shown in this simplified representation. There are already
many entities to consider, and many more variables that affect the profitability at each
juncture to take note of, before one can arrive at the profitability of the entire system.
And this does not even include the sale of mutual funds.
Even if one argues that this is difficult but possible, there is also the issue of data
availability and accuracy. Hard sources of accurate, detailed information and data are
often difficult to obtain for the financial services industry. Much of the information
that one seeks to analyse an industry is deemed to be "sensitive data" and "proprietary
information. In the case of the mutual fund industry, it is often tempting to embrace
the convenience of published data on operating expenses of mutual funds for the
purpose of profitability analysis.
For mutual fund industry, the common sources of cost-and-profit data that one usually
finds are operating expense ratios. For example, in 1996, average expenses for
Fidelity (assets exceeding $100 billion) were around 0.75% (Forbes, August 25, 1997,
p.152-153). These expenses include management fees, charges of the fund's
custodian, accountants, and attorneys, the cost of issuing share certificates and
disbursing dividends, and expenses for printing, postage, and mailing. Nevertheless,
one must be aware of the possibility of using "soft dollars" to pay for some expenses,
and not just take such expense figures as given.
As an illustration, suppose a fund manager needs a computer. Instead of directly
purchasing one with cash and writing it down as an expense item, the manager can
just pay a slightly higher-than-necessary commission (soft dollars) to the stock broker
and the broker buys the computer for him. Or, he might buy the computer himself but
send the bill to the broker. In essence, soft dollar credits are accounting conduits for
fund managers to channel their expenses over to the stockbroker and make the fund
expenses appear lower than they are.
The reason for such practice is clear. With weekly and quarterly reports on mutual
fund performance appearing on newspapers and magazines, as well as a proliferation
of self-help books on mutual funds investment guidance, investors have become more
well-informed. Such awareness has also been heightened by the increasing presence
of institutional investors who generally have better resources to evaluate and select a
FIGURE 1. Comparison Between The Production Process For A Mutual Fund (a Financial Product)
Versus Low Density Polyethylene (a Manufactured Product)
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fund. No rational investor would choose to invest in a fund that has high expenses
relative to its assets. It is inefficient. Therefore, soft dollar credits usage to hide
expenses is common among fund managers. Together with the problem of
complicated web of transactions associated with financial services, soft dollars'
effects would only be magnified. Furthermore, it is difficult to draw a line at each
stage and all it stage 1, or stage 2. At the margin, it is often terribly vexing to try to
distinguish, say, normal profit from normal-plus profit. This makes the use of the
profit cycle as an analytical tool daunting, if not impossible.
Porter (1990) proposed a "cluster" theory, which is modeled to analyse the
agglomeration effects of firms in a region and the region's competitive advantage in
that "cluster". The strictest definition, in the spirit of Porter, defines "a cluster" to be
a grouping of industries linked together through customer, or supplier, or other
relationships (Porter, 1990). Aside from this, he did not provide the details as to the
pre-requisites of a cluster. In his updated version, Porter (1998) mentioned that the
group of industries must be of "critical mass" (significant in terms of size), and that it
includes both upstream and downstream industries'. Scrutinizing the examples of
"clusters" that Porter (1990; 1992) gave in his works, I noticed three similarities
among them -- presence of innovation, linkages (relational and spatial) among the
group of industries, and competitive advantage over other regions/nations (with
regard to the cluster in question). These should also appear on the list of criteria to
qualify as a "cluster".
The determinants of competitive advantages are factor conditions, demand conditions,
related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (Porter,
1990). Together they form what Porter calls a "diamond system"2 . In addition,
Porter also acknowledges the role of the government in his model, to take into
account the effects of government policies interacting with the "diamond system", as
well as the role of chance to rationalize its effects on the determinants of competitive
advantage. Together with the "diamond", they form the "complete system" [Figure
2]. He also recognizes the magnitude of influence that culture and history has on
competitive advantage because the effects are difficult for outsiders to emulate
(Porter, 1990). This echoes Krugman's consideration of the role of history in
locational and economic agglomeration of firms. Porter (1998) revisited his model
and updated it. However, there were no major changes, and much of the original
framework remains intact.
1 The product of an upstream industry would serve as an input for the downstream industry.
2 Granted that both "diamond" and "square" have four corners, and that the former is just a tilted
version of the latter, I think it is the nuances of the words that made Porter label his system as "the
diamond". Afterall, it is more desirable to possess a sparkling stone than a stodgy square. But there
could be also some suggestion of dynamism by using the diamond (diagonals create visual instability
and motion), which is fitting in his framework.
Figure 2. : The Complete System
Source: Porter, Michael E.,1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations (p.127)
In the following section, I shall take a closer look at the "cluster" theory and explain
why I have chosen it to be the most applicable model to use in analysing the financial
services industry.
Porter's "Cluster" Theory
Porter's "cluster" theory, though more elaborate and updated, share the basic
underlying structure with Francois Perroux's growth-pole model (Parr, 1973). For
this reason, it is worth taking a moment to look at the basic premises of the growth-
pole theory. Under the growth-pole theory, the presence of a "propulsive entity" and
innovation are key to explaining the emergence of growth poles. A propulsive entity
can be a firm, an industry, or even a tertiary education institution, that is highly
innovative. This ingenuity is the main drive that propels the firm or industry to grow
at a disproportionately higher rate than other economic entities around them (Rees,
1986). With such enviable robust growth, this propulsive firm/industry would then
attract others to join in the economic as well as geographic space. This is because by
locating near this key entity, others would be able to enjoy and benefit from all the
positive spin-offs that it generates, as well as the organizational structure set up by the
propulsive firm (Rees, 1986).
In a similar, but more elaborate, fashion, Porter's industry cluster framework is
modeled to analyse the agglomeration effects of firms in a region and the region's
competitive advantage in that "cluster". Here, the propulsive forces are two-fold --
the drive derived from the cluster that gives the region its competitive edge, and the
push resulting from a mutually enhancing integration of factors, in the region, that
affect the innovative capacity, which is key to the creation and sustaining of
competitive advantages. The former is what Porter calls "industrial competitiveness",
and the latter "the diamond". As in the growth-pole framework, this drive from the
cluster is highly dependent on innovation (which can be incremental, rather than
radical in Porter's framework) (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3).
The two-tier approach to competitive advantage analysis makes sense. It is necessary
that the industry itself should have some competitive advantage before it can exploit
the strengths of the region to enhance its competitiveness. Competitive advantage is
created and cultivated through industrial competition. The higher the intensity of
competition, the more competitive the industry would be. It is simply the outcome of
Darwinian selection. Porter (1990) has identified the five competitive forces that
determine such industry competition:
* the threat of new entrants;
* the threat of substitute products or services;
e the bargaining power of suppliers;
* the bargaining power of buyers; and
* the rivalry among the existing competitors (Porter, 1990, Chapter 2).
The threat of new entrants into the industry would mean either a smaller slice of the
pie for each firm, or existing firms could engage in intensive research and
development (R&D) activities and introduce some form of innovation that would
enlarge the entire pie. Similarly, the worst-case scenario of having their product
replaced by another new product or services is enough to push existing firms to
improve and upgrade their products and services. In the mutual fund industry, this is
one of the forces that pushes the management companies to continue to introduce new
funds and investment features into the market. The bargaining power of suppliers and
buyers, and the rivalry among the existing competitors, all prevents the industry from
sitting on its laurels -- it keeps them alert in the fear of becoming obsolete.
These forces shape the prices firms can charge, the costs they have to bear, and the
investment required to compete in the industry. Therefore, these are also the
determinants of the profitability of the industry (Porter, 1990, Chapter 2). Only when
equipped with industrial competitiveness can an industry use the location's strengths
to its own advantage [Figure 3].
Competitive advantage also grows out of history (i.e., to be the first in the business
realm) through the process of rational expectation. In light of Krugman's insight
(Krugman,1991), the circular process of historical accident, initial increasing returns,
and rational expectation, sets forth a self-fulfilling prophecy that buttresses the early
mover against newcomer attacks. For example, Boston was the first state to have a
sizable and efficient money management industry, which includes trusts and mutual
funds. Because Bostonians were in the business longer than most others, they had
more time to grow and build up reputation. This leads the average rational expectator
to expect that if Boston has had such a long history in the business, Boston-based
companies should continue to carry out this line of interest better than the new
comers. History raises the early mover onto a pedestal that bestows credibility,
prestige, and competitive advantage.
The strengths of the location of the industries constitute the diamond, which is a
mutually reinforcing system. The effect of each variable is contingent on the state of
the others in such a way that advantages in one can have positive effects on the others
(Porter, 1990). Factor conditions refer to factors of production, or basic inputs, that
allow competition to occur. These, which include labour, land, natural resources,
capital, and scientific knowledge, can be broadly classified as basic or advanced, or
generic or specialized inputs (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). Of these, factors of
Figure 3. Two-Tier Structure Of Competitive Advantage
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production that are specialized, or industry specific, wield the largest influence over
the particular industry's competitiveness.
For instance, for the mutual fund industry, advanced inputs include labour which is
not only highly-skilled, but with skills specialized to the industry (e.g., portfolio
managers); on the other hand, semi-skilled labour are considered to be basic factors of
production. A telephone operator can work for other companies just as well as it
could for a mutual fund management company like Fidelity. Even office space can be
divided in to basic and advanced factors of production, with the back office
operations in the suburbs (basic input), and front office (advanced input) in the
downtown area.
Demand conditions refer to the nature of the home demands. Home demand
conditions are crucial in shaping an industry and determining its competitive
advantage. This factor affects the industry in three main ways -- the mix and
character of domestic buyer demands, the size and pattern of growth of domestic
demand, and the mechanisms by which the region's domestic preferences are
transmitted to foreign markets (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). Related and supporting
industries refer to the local pressure or absence of suppliers of materials, components,
machinery and services, as well as the existence of related industries. The presence of
competitive, specialized home-based creates advantages in several ways. First,
customers who are geographically close to the suppliers often have the benefit of early
access to the latest models and newest products (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). Second,
proximity and close working relationships with home-based suppliers enhances
innovation and upgrading. This is because there is the advantage of quick and
continuous flow of information, joint work on improvements, and mutual pressures to
advance (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). Third, proximity to each other allows better,
ongoing coordination between supplier and customer (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3).
As for the fourth determinant of competitiveness, firm strategy and rivalry, it refers to
the rules, incentives, and norms governing the type and intensity of local rivalry.
Porter (1990) posits that competitiveness grows out of a context that supports
innovation, through policies and norms that encourage sustained investment in skills,
capabilities and physical assets. Local rivalry and competition spurs companies to
innovate and improve their capabilities to lower costs, enhance quality, and invent
new products and processes (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). This would depend on the
concentration of firms within the industry of that region.
Finally, the entire diamond is strengthened further by the interplay of government
policies and the role of chance, history, and culture (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). Porter
(1990) has chosen to place these factors exogenous to the diamond probably because
a change in any of these could either enhance the workings of the diamond, or it could
tip the delicate balance and negatively affect the whole system. For example, overtly
protective trade policies to shield the home industry from the waves of competition
might undermine its ability to innovate and circumvent the situation. Chance events
are occurrences that firms and industries have no control over. They are important in
that they help to introduce discontinuities that allow the industries to augment its
competitive position (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). As for history and culture, Porter
(1990) agrees that these have significant effects on the diamond by influencing the
development of the determinants. Furthermore, these effects are usually difficult for
competitors to mimic. Later in the thesis, I shall show how persistent perceptions can
be, and how such apprehension about Bostonians being the ideal conservative
"Yankee trustee", has made it difficult for competitors to emulate them.
What is it that makes the "cluster" theory most easily adaptable to the financial
services sector? First, the concept of "a cluster" being a group of industries
interlinked via various forms of relationships, fits the financial sector which is made
up of many sub-sectors. The activities, products, and services offered by each of
these sub-sectors usually require those offered by another. For example, a mutual
fund management company usually requires a bank to act as its custodian and
safeguard the assets of its funds. The portfolio manager of a fund often would need
brokerage services to execute his/her orders to buy or sell a stock or bond.
Second, a cluster is easier to identify than a propulsive industry alone. In the web of
inter-relations of the financial world, it can be terribly difficult to discern which unit,
exactly, is the propulsive industry in question. Moreover, the modern take of this
model is rather flexible. For example, one may include the effects of transportation
costs and distance under the "factor conditions" category when considering locational
decisions of, say, the aluminum industry. But one may also choose to eliminate such
factors when considering an industry for which such factors might not be of much
concern.
Finally, even though profits are still the crux of decisions in Porter's model, the
diamond proves to be a helpful guide as to how one might approach the issue of
profitability and hence, location and agglomeration decisions. Not only does the
diamond-framework allow systematic analysis of an industry, it also provides the
analyst or policy maker a good way to determine how he/she might affect the profits
(and hence, firm/industrial location and concentration) through these four channels of
the diamond system.
Although the cluster theory does meet at least more of the needs of the mutual fund
industry (financial sector), than the other theories discussed above, there are still a
few caveats. The effect of home demand on competitiveness depends very much on
which sub-sector we are looking at, and the nature of its activities. For sub-sectors
that have non-regional clienteles, and products that are similar to those sold by
competing firms and are equally accessible to clients (e.g., brokerages), it is not
entirely clear how home demand affects the industry's competitiveness. On the other
hand, the mix and nature of home demand certainly plays a part in affecting the
industry's ability to grow and compete, if the activities of the subject in question are
concentrated more locally (e.g., consumer banking).
The "cluster" theory was originally modeled to examine the effect of location on
competition, identify the region's sources of competitive advantage for a "cluster",
and evaluate the region's competitiveness. However, Porter (1998) suggests that the
theory might work well in reverse -- examine the region's competitive advantage in
the context of the industry and explain the location decision of the industry. Although
this seems plausible since industries would choose to locate where the business
climate is conducive to their operations, it is still worth putting it to the test. And this
is one of the aims of this study. Another issue to consider would be the necessity of a
cluster in order to compete in a certain industry. Granted that clustering is important
for competition, but can a region be competitive in a certain industry without having a
cluster?
Cluster theory also suggests that with suitable government policies, a region can
override its lack of favourable cultural and historical foundation, foster the creation of
the diamond of competitive advantage and ultimately, a cluster/clusters (Porter, 1990,
Chapter 12). Even in the updated version of cluster theory, Porter (1998) still
maintains this stance. But could this applicable to the mutual fund industry or the
whole financial services industry as well? In my case study, the analysis includes
examining the role of history on the formation of the Boston mutual fund cluster, and
determining if the lack of history can be circumvent by appropriate government
policies aimed to create a mutual fund cluster. Finally, in light of my findings, I shall
attempt to suggest some policy implications of this study.
CHAPTER III
MUTUAL FUNDS
Definition
Mutual funds are the modem cousins of the British investment trusts. A mutual fund,
is a portfolio of assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, etc.) created and managed by an
investment company. It is divided into smaller units or shares and sold to investors.
Take, for example, Merrily Lynch Asset Management's Developing Capital Markets
Fund. This fund consists of a collection of equity investments in various emerging
markets, such as Indonesia and China. An individual investor can participate in these
investments by buying a certain fraction of the fund and reap his proportionate share
of returns when the fund performs well. One might think of mutual fund management
companies as a subset of investment banks, conducting only one of the latter's many
activities. Traditionally, investment banks were engaged primarily in the
underwriting of securities (i.e., purchasing securities when first issued by corporations
or government entities and reselling the securities to final investors). However, these
nimble members of the financial sector were quick to take on other forms of
investment-related activities, of which mutual fund management is one. These
secondary market activities have become increasingly important to investment banks.
To be clear, by "mutual funds", I refer to open-ended funds; under the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC), the "mutual fund industry" falls under SIC 672
(Investment Offices) and SIC 628 (Services Allied with the Exchange of Securities) 3.
Overview: Growth and Development of the Mutual Fund Industry
In order to give a better sense of scale, as well as a feel of the magnitude of
development that has occurred in the industry since the inception of the first mutual
fund in the United States, I have included here a brief overview.
The rate of establishment of mutual fund management companies has been rather
steady over the past few decades. Although there is not a period during which there
was an especially distinct proliferation of management companies, the growth in
mutual funds is quite a different story. During the 1940s, mutual funds became
increasingly popular. Within two decades, the number of funds increased from 80 to
160 and total assets catapulted from $500 million to $17 billion by 1960 (Investment
3 To be accurate, these should be SIC 6722 (Management investment funds, open-end; money market
mutual funds; and mutual fund sales on own account) and SIC 6282 (Investment advisory service).
However, due to suppression, the County Business Pattern database only allows access to a level of up
to 3-digit SIC-codes for the mutual fund industry assumed in the study. However, it is probably the
only one that allows one to analyse county-by-county at such level of detail. Therefore, figures are
slightly overestimated.
Company Institute, 1996) [Figure 4]. By the end of 1996, the US has a total of 6,270
mutual funds with a total combined assets of $3.54 trillion. Net new cash flow to
stock funds alone reached $222.08 billion in 1996, up from $128.22 billion in 1995.
It is, therefore, not surprising that mutual fund assets represented about 14% of the
total value of all outstanding stock in the stock market at the end of the third quarter
of 1996 (Investment Company Institute, 1997). Such dramatic growth in the mutual
fund industry can be explained in part by the rising prominence of institutional
investors (who usually hold a much higher level of assets per account than an average
individual investor) as mutual fund shareholders.
Not only did the number of funds and fund assets rise quickly, but with considerable
financial deepening in the mutual fund industry, even the types of funds and
investment features offered have increased. For example, according to the Investment
Company Institute classification, mutual funds were divided into 16 investment
categories in 1988. In less than a decade, the number of such categories reached 21
[Table 1]. Such an increase in the variety in mutual funds points to the amount of
incremental innovation that has taken place. The motivating force was a response to
the greater ease that investors are with mutual fund investment, and to rising
competition as new firms enter the market. With more competitors seeking a piece of
the pie, existing firms can preserve their stance in the market only if they innovate.
Besides bringing new investment products into the market, various investment
features were also introduced. For example, an exchange feature was initiated during
the 1980s to allow an investor to swap holdings in one fund to another within a group
of funds under a common management (Moon and Siu, 1995). In the light of
Porter's cluster theory, these efforts culminate into the existing firms' attempt to
protect and improve their competitive advantage.
The Boston Mutual Fund Cluster
As previously introduced, the criteria to qualify as a "cluster" are:
" presence of innovation;
* presence of linkages among the group of industries; and
* competitive advantage (includes size consideration).
Innovation. At the time that the first mutual fund, the Massachusetts Investors Trust,
was launched in 1924, four aspects really set it apart as an innovative investment
instrument. First, it offered a continuous stream of new shares in addition to the old
ones that could be redeemed anytime, at prices based on the current value of the
fund's assets (open-ended investment) (Griffeth, 1995). In contrast, investment trusts
sold only a fixed number of shares at prices determined by supply and demand
(closed-end investment). Griffeth (1995) noted that it was this novel concept of
redeemable shares that made mutual funds grow in popularity. With redeemable
FIGURE 4. Growth in the Number of Funds, 1940-1995
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Table 1 Types of Mutual Funds'
Equity Funds
Aggressive Growth
Growth
Growth and Income
Equity-International
Equity-Global
Precious Metals/Gold
Bond and Equity Funds
Equity-Income
Flexible Portfolio
Balanced
Income-Mixed
Bond Funds
National Municipal
State Municipal
Income-Bond
Government
GNMA or Ginnie Mae
Funds
Global Bond
Corporate Bond
High Yield Bond
Money Market Funds
Tax-Exempt, National
Tax-Exempt, State
Taxable
Investing primarily in common stocks with the goal of long-term
growth
Maximum appreciation with no concern for current income.
Capital appreciation with some concern for current income.
Capital appreciation and steady current income.
Capital appreciation from non-US common stocks.
Capital appreciation from both US and non-US stocks.
Maintain 2/3 of portfolio assets in securities invested in securities
associated with gold, silver, and other precious metals.
Investing in a mix of common stocks and lont-term debt with the goal
of achieving both long-term growth and income.
High income from common stocks with history of continuous
dividends.
Stocks, bonds, and liquid assets varying with market conditions.
Capital appreciation, current income, and stability of principal.
High current income from both stocks and bonds.
Investing in long-term bonds with the primary goal of income.
Municipal bonds issued by any or all states.
Municipal bonds issued by specific states.
Mixture of corporate and government bonds.
US Treasury securities.
Mortgage securities backed by Government National Mortgage
Association.
Bonds of both US and non-US issuers.
Diversified portfolio of corporate bonds.
Maintain at least 2/3 of assets in non-investment-grade corporate
bonds*.
Investing in short-term, highly liquid securities.
Short-term obligations of state and local governments.
Short-term obligations of state and local governments within
specific states.
Short-term obligations of US government and corporations.
Note: A The Investment Company Institute excludes closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, variable annuities,
and unregistered funds (e.g., hedge funds)from their data.
* Non-investment-grade bonds refer to corporate bonds that are rated Baa or lower by Moody's rating
service, and BBB or lower by Standard & Poor's rating service.
Source: Fortune, Peter. "Mutual Funds, Part I: Reshaping the American Financial System ". New England
Economic Review (Jul/Aug 97).
Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book (33rd Edition, 1993).
shares, investors perceived that investing in a fund is equivalent to having a deposit
account at the bank, except that the latter tend to yield a relatively low rate of return in
terms of interest earned.
Second, while most prudent financiers of that era invested in bonds, the
Massachusetts Investors Trust portfolio was composed entirely of common stocks.
Third, although the fund was invested in equities, it adopted a conservative approach
(Griffeth, 1995). This contrasted starkly with the more speculative and highly
leveraged closed-end trusts that met their downfall when the stock market crashed in
1929. Finally, the fund publicly disclosed the composition of its portfolio, which was
unusual for that period. Today, mutual funds are required by statutory law to reveal
their investment portfolios (Griffeth, 1995).
Linkages. The creation and sale of a fund usually require the services of several
entities. For open-ended mutual funds, limited internal resources makes it common
for management companies to contract out most of the activities to other independent
corporations providing these services (Fortune, 1997). As a result, linkages are
formed among mutual fund management companies, banks, and other financial
services provider [Figure 5]. These are usually located near the management
companies in Boston. For example, State Street Bank & Trust Co., the largest and
oldest mutual fund custodian is where its name indicates -- State Street, right in the
centre of Boston's financial district. In the case of huge management companies (e.g.,
Fidelity), however, these agents are often their affiliates (Fortune, 1997).
The sponsor organizes the fund at inception. The advisor, who can either be an in-
house or a sub-contracted money manager, is responsible for the fund's portfolio
decisions, as well as its borrowing and lending decisions (Fortune, 1997). As an
open-ended fund, the number of shareholders, not to mention its shareholder profile,
is constantly changing. Amplified by the liquidity of a fund and the fact that investors
become increasingly comfortable with mutual fund investment, investors today are
more inclined to view mutual fund investment just like stock market investment.
With the large number of transactions, three other entities are vital in the management
of an open-ended fund. The administrator takes up the task of accounting and
monitoring of cash flows and transactions; the custodian, which is usually a bank,
safeguards the fund's assets, and makes and receives payments on behalf of the fund;
and the transfer agent is responsible for maintaining records of who the shareholders
are, for receiving or paying cash from sales or redemption of the fund's shares, and
for distributing cash dividends or capital gain distributions (Fortune, 1997).
As for supporting services, the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the United
States, 1992 reveals that the top five services consumed by the mutual fund industry
are real estate agents (US$4,905 million), advertising (US$3,424 million), computer
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Source: Fortune, Peter. "Mutual Funds, Part I: Reshaping the American Financial System". New England Economic
Review (Jul/Aug 97).
John Moon and Joanne Siu. "Analysis of the Boston Mutual Fund Industry" 1995.
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TRANSFER AGENT
Performs record-keeping
services, issues new shares,
cancels redeemed share and
makes distributions to
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and data processing (US$3,091 million), legal services (US$2,800 million), and
communications (excluding radio and TV broadcasting) (US$2,716 million). Others
include accounting and business services. Legal and accounting services assist in
ensuring legal and tax compliance of mutual funds; business services, such as printing
services, help the management company in printing prospectus and mailers.
Communication services are essential for management companies to reach not only
clients, but also their transfer agents, custodians, and other entities related in their
day-to-day operations. Computer and data processing services are critical for
providing the most up-to-date pricing and fundamental data on companies, stocks,
bonds, etc., and software to help the portfolio manager to make quicker and better
decisions.
Competitive Advantage. Given the data that are available at the level of detail
required (i.e. county-by-county, and at least 3-digit SIC-code), I propose that size,
specialization, and renown indicate competitive advantage. This is because, without
competitive advantage, profit margins would be narrow, and the industries would not
have grown as large, nor would the individual firms have the incentive to specialize;
without size and specialization, there would be virtually no fame. In other words,
renown can only be attained, provided the group of industries has some competitive
advantage to give it the chance to expand, and the impetus to specialize.
In terms of size, Boston stands out in both concentration of employment in the mutual
fund industry, as well as in the amount of assets held by Boston-based mutual fund
families. Here, I have employed location quotient to show the degree of
concentration of employment in the mutual fund industry. Location quotients indicate
the degree of concentration a region is in an industry, relative to the national average.
In 1994, Suffolk County (where Boston is) of Massachusetts has a location quotient
of 25.0 for employment in the mutual fund industry. This means that Suffolk County
is 25 times more concentrated than the nation, on average, in the mutual fund
industry. This figure rose to 28.6 in 1995. New York County, on the other hand,
exhibited location quotients of 8.2 and 7.9, in 1994 and 1995 respectively [Table 2].
In terms of assets, total net assets of Boston-based mutual fund families were about
26% of the total net assets held by the entire nation's mutual fund families, by the end
of 1995. In comparison, New York-based mutual fund families accounted for
approximately 15% of total net assets by the end of 1995. And under these terms,
.4these two regions (clusters) are, by far, the largest in the nation .
In fact, eight of the fifty largest mutual fund administrators are Boston-based (Moon
& Siu, 1995). State Street Bank & Trust Co., The Boston Company, and Investors
Bank & Trust Co., the three custodian giants in Massachusetts, provided 42% of
mutual fund assets held in custody by the top fifteen custodian providers in 1993
4 Author's calculation using data from Investment Companies Yearbook 1996, CDA/Weisenberger
Investment Companies Services (a branch of CDA Investment Technologies).
(Moon & Siu, 1995). In addition, Massachusetts transfer agents -- The Shareholder
Services Group, Boston Financial Data Services, Inc., and 440 Financial Group --
served almost 26% of the 50,500 accounts served by the top twelve agents (Moon &
Siu, 1995).
TABLE 2. Location Ouotients For Employmentl in the Mutual Fund Sector (SIC 672 & SIC 628)
Suffolk 25.0 1 28.6
New York 8.2 7.9
Source: County Business Pattern and author's calculations.
Note: I Employment figures are those for mid-March employment in 1994. They reflect paid employment which
consists of full- and part-time employees, including salaried officers and executives of corporations, who
are on payroll in the pay period including March 12. Included are employees on paid sick leave,
holidays, and vacations; not included are proprietors and partners of unincorporatied businesses.
* Location Quotients (LQ) are computed as follows:
(Employment in Industry u)-riL/(Employment in Industry u,,.,.,,a
(Total Employment)region /(Total Employment),,naonl
If LQ >1, the region is more specialized than the nation in Industry p;
LQ =1, the region and the nation has an equivalent degree of concentration in Industry p; and
LQ <1, the region is less specialized than the nation in Industry g
As for specialization and renown, the fact that Suffolk County dominates the mutual
fund industry by such a large margin, even though it lags well behind New York
County in terms of the number of mutual fund management firms, suggests the higher
degree of specialization and larger firm size of the mutual fund industry in Suffolk
County relative to New York County, and/or other counties in the United States5 .
This is because the bigger players in New York County are mostly large investment
firms (e.g., Morgan Stanley, Prudential Securities) that engage in a multitude of
investment activities (e.g., stock brokerage, options trading) and not just in mutual
funds. Other New York-based mutual fund management companies are very small
relative to those in Suffolk County. But this also brings in the history variable. Firms
are usually not huge when they start up. They need time to grow.
In terms of renown, Suffolk County boasts of top names, such as Fidelity and Putnam,
that consistently rank among the top twenty mutual fund families. On The Wall Street
Journal Almanac 1998 "10-Year Best Performers" list, Fidelity managed funds
accounted for 15 out of a total of 50 winning funds. The list also shows familiar
Bostonian names such as Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS is the restructured
Massachusetts Investors Trust) and Putnam. Once again, history comes into play. In
s County Business Patterns, 1994/95.
order to gain renown, a company must be in existence for a long enough period of
time to establish a record of performance and build up credibility.
Finally, for Suffolk County, mutual fund activities form the core of these large
players' business [Table 3]. Having fulfilled the three conditions of innovation,
linkages, and competitive advantage, it is plausible to conclude that a mutual fund
industry "cluster" exists in Boston.
Table 3 Profile of mutual fund industry in Suffolk County (Massachusetts) and New York
County (New York), accordine to number of employees per firm, 1995.
County Number of Employees per Firm
SIC-Code
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50~99 100~249 250499 500-999 21000
SIC 672 8 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 2
New York BNY) n
SIC 672 4 16 6 8 0 2100
Business~~~ Ptes1995Source: CountyBusiness Pattern .
CHAPTER IV
APPLYING THE CLUSTER MODEL TO THE MUTUAL FUND
INDUSTRY
In this chapter, I shall apply the cluster model to the mutual fund industry, and
identify the variables for each of the four determinants of competitive advantage.
[Figure 6] shows the way Porter's diamond can be used to view the mutual fund
industry. Thereafter, I shall proceed with analysing each of the variables and
determine Boston's competitiveness for each of them. Additionally, I shall also look
into how history might have contributed to the success of the Boston mutual fund
industry.
FACTOR CONDITIONS
Factors of production are the basic requirements for industrial development and
enhanced competition. These include land, labour, capital, infrastructure, natural
resources, and scientific knowledge (Porter, 1990). When applied to the mutual fund
industry, the specialized factors of production identified are land (office space), strong
labour force, and strong technological capabilities. General factors include back
office space (usually located in the suburbs) and semi-skilled labour, such as those
involved in clerical chores.
Land/Office Space
Operations of the mutual fund industry can be divided into two broad categories --
front office and back office operation. Front office operations are mostly managerial
in nature, and generally non-routine. They often involve face-to face contact with
people outside of the firm, especially clients. In the context of mutual fund
management companies, these include portfolio management, analysis, product
development, legal services, and central management (McGahey, Malloy, Kazanas,
and Jacobs, 1991). On the other hand, back office activities are generally more
routine and largely clerical in nature, not requiring much personal interaction with
people outside the firm. Examples of back office operations are customer phone
service clerks, claims processing and payment, and basic internal management
support (McGahey, Malloy, Kazanas, and Jacobs, 1991).
Front office operations, such as fund establishment, benefit from the trust built
between parties in face-to-face discussions or negotiations. There is a locational
advantage for such operations to be centrally located in the central business district,
because the greater access to services such as those provided by downtown law and
Figure 6 "The Diamond" in the Context of the Mutual Fund Industry
Source: Moon and Siu, 1995. "Analysis of the Boston Mutual Fund Industry".
accounting firms, translates to reductions in travel time and costs (Moon & Siu,
1995).
Moreover, office location and appearance does have some impact on the mutual fund
management company's image. As I have mentioned earlier, there has been a rising
prominence of institutional investors on the mutual funds investment scene. And
successful courting of such large investors yields attractive gains. Although
performance record and reputation are key marketing assets for the management
company, a prestigious address would only enhance its image even more. It triggers
the almost reflex response from the visitor -- thinking that the company is successful
enough to afford such space.
On the other hand, rents/costs weigh heavier on the location decisions of back office
operations, which consist mostly of mutual fund services that are conducted over the
telephone or by mail (Moon & Siu, 1995). Typically, back office employment
account for the bulk of the management company's total employment. For example,
of the 3,000 employees working at Putnam, 2,300 are engaged in back office activities
(Moon & Siu, 1995). Therefore, cheap land/buildings is/are preferred to house such
operations in order to keep operating expenses low. These are usually located in the
suburbs where rents are significantly lower.
In this aspect, Massachusetts does not have much cost advantage in terms of office
rent compared to most competitor states (e.g., Maryland, Pennsylvania). It has
traditionally been relatively costly with respect to office space. However, when
compared to New York city, which has the reputation of being one of the places with
the most expensive office rent in the world, Boston would have an edge in this area.
According to Cushman & Wakefield, on the list of "The 5 Cities With the Highest
Commercial Market Rents" (1997), New York City leads with an annual rent per
square foot of US$38.09; Boston ranks third on the list, with an annual rent per square
foot of US$36.20.
The glut in commercial real estate which had rents plunging during the early 1990s
was a national, rather than a regional phenomenon. Furthermore, the excess office
space available in the early 1990s could not fully explain the decisions of firms to
locate in Boston. As I have noted earlier, there is not a particular period in which one
can identify as a boom period when management companies proliferated. The rate of
increase in the number of mutual fund management companies has been rather
constant over the past decades.6 Therefore, the advantage that Boston has with
respect to office space, is for front office operations for which office rent is not as big
an issue as it is for back office operations (Moon & Siu, 1995).
6 Interview with Matthew Fink, president of the Investment Company Institute (by telephone).
Strong Labour Force
Boston's strength in highly-skilled and specialized labour is drawn from two main
sources -- proximity to the nation's leading tertiary educational institutions, and the
relative size of the Boston mutual fund industry. Even though front office operations
do not necessarily have to draw from the local labour pool, the local availability of
highly-skilled labour force still gives Boston an edge over competing states.
Front Office Recruitment. Given the non-physical characteristic of a mutual fund, a
good record of performance serves as a testimonial to "product quality". With the
increasing media coverage and emphasis on fund performance, its importance has
risen even more. Consequently, faced with a relatively limited local pool of
productive portfolio managers, companies are likely to recruit or subcontract portfolio
managers based on their performance record, rather than on their location (Moon &
Siu, 1995). For example, a New York-based management company would employ a
manager from California to come to New York to manage one of its funds, if it feels
that the individual is sufficiently competent. Similarly, the manager would accept the
job if the wages and compensation offered are enough for him to relocate to New
York.
Evidence suggests that Boston has a relatively large local pool of such highly-skilled
and specialized labour for front office recruitment. According to the 1990 US Census
Data, around 27% of Massachusetts' population of 25 years and older hold at least a
bachelor's degree, as compared to 23% for New York State. Host to some 120
colleges and universities, which include the nation's leading educational institutions,
such as Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Massachusetts has
ensured a steady supply of highly-skilled individuals entering the labour pool. Should
one start to scrutinize the academic records of personnel's in the mutual fund
management industry, one is bound to find some "Harvard man/woman", "MIT
graduate", etc.. For example, Philip L. Carret, founder of the Pioneer Fund, holds a
Harvard degree; Edward C. Johnson II, president of Fidelity Fund and founder of
Fidelity Management & Research Company, is another Harvard man; the legendary
Peter Lynch, manager of Fidelity's Magellan Fund from 1977 to 1990, acquired his
first degree from Boston College; Mark Mobius, manager for the Templeton7 family
of funds, is an alumni of both Boston University and MIT (Griffeth, 1995). Although
the list is not exhaustive, [Table 4] gives an idea the extent to which local colleges
and universities supplement front office employment. However, one might be quick
to point out that New York city should be geographically close enough to Boston to
reap this benefit. To a certain degree, New York city does benefit from its relative
7 The parent company of the family of Templeton Funds is Franklin/Templeton, which is not a Boston-
based management company.
proximity to Boston. But it still lags behind Boston in terms of mutual fund industrial
concentration.
Table 4 Examples of personnels who are alumni of Massachusetts colleges and universities
Name Position Academic Background
(Fund Family/Fund)
George Putnam President, Chairman, Trustee Harvard University & Harvard
(Putnam American Government Income University Graduate School of Business
Fund) Administration.
Daniel Pierce Chairman of Board Harvard University
(Scudder, Stevens & Clark)
John F. Cogan Jr. President, Trustee Harvard University
(Pioneer || A Massachusetts Business Trust)
David D. Triple Executive Vice President, Trustee Harvard University Law School &
(Pioneer 11 A Massachusetts Business Trust) Harvard University
William H. Keough Treasurer, Trustee Boston College & Northeastern
(Pioneer 11 A Massachusetts Business Trust) University
Jefferey Shames President MIT Sloan School of Management
(Massachusetts Financial Services Co. Inc.t)
James Russell Senior Vice President Boston University & Babson College
(Massachusetts Financial Services Co. Inc.)
David C. Weinstein Senior Vice President Boston University & Boston College
(FMR Corp.*)
Landon T. Clay Chairman of Board Harvard University
I (Eaton Vance Corp.)
Note: TMassachusetts Financial Services (MFS) is the restructured Massachusetts Investors Trust (the other
MIT).
*FMR Corp., is the parent company of Fidelity Investment.
Source: D&B Reference Book of Corporate Managements: America's Corporate Leaders, 1998
The size of the mutual fund industry in Boston relative to its other US counterparts
also serves to enhance the pool of specialized labour. Reputation is extremely
important to portfolio managers. It not only gives them the publicity needed for
attracting better employment opportunities, but also serves as a proof to their superior
capabilities so that they can command a higher payment in future. Working for big,
renown management companies might be the one of the best route.
The fact that Boston has had a early start in the mutual fund industry, plays a role in
attracting competent money managers to come to Boston to work. History is
important in the realm of financial services. In the world of financial services, as in
many other industries, there is some intrinsic and intangible value in being the first
bank, or the longest operating management company. Through time and repeated
transactions, a record of performance builds up and with that comes credibility and
reputation.8 Massachusetts Investors Trust, the first mutual fund to be launched in the
US, came into being in Boston in 1924. Its custodian, State Street Bank & Trust, has
8 This is probably the reason why we often see or hear the phrase "Since 1862", or "In operation since
1919" , for example, right after the name of the particular company, or bank. Even retailers, such as
shoemakers, use this -- it gives them credibility and prestige.
been in operation since 1792 (then known as Union Bank)! Scudder, which offered
its first no-load mutual fund in 1928, has been in the investment business since 1919.
Only with history of performance would there be credibility and reputation; only with
credibility and reputation would there be any "branded" institutions. Portfolio
managers like working for such "branded" institutions, because they benefit from
their reputation and share the trust and credibility that these institutions have earned
over the years.
By being the first in the game, Boston has had time to grow and gather momentum
ahead of others. By 1947, Massachusetts Investors Trust was the biggest fund in the
business at $200 million in assets (Griffeth, 1995.) There is no doubt that the biggest
company garners the most attention, the most media coverage, and the most publicity.
Being bigger and longer in service, Boston has also gained, to a certain extent,
prestige in the sphere of mutual funds management. Furthermore, Bostonian
companies, being bigger, tend to have more resources to devote to performance-
enhancing strategy, like investing in computerization of the firm, subscribe to better
data vendors/providers, employing more research assistance, etc.(Wall Street
Computer Review, various issues). All these factors make it much more desirable
and attractive for money managers to come and work here, because it provides better
tools for them to enhance their performance record, as well as boost their image and
their future marketability. A higher concentration of mutual fund management
companies in Boston also implies that more job opportunities are open to a portfolio
manager, and job switching might be easier here than in other states. Therefore, with
more money managers seeking employment in Boston, domestic management
companies have access to a better, more favourable labour supply.
Back Office Recruitment. Recruitment for such administrative, accounting, and
computer-related positions, usually draw from the local labour pool. In this area,
proximity to the nation's leading universities gives Boston-based management
companies some competitive advantage over their competitors. It would be easier and
less costly for such companies to organize career fairs at local colleges or in the
Boston vicinity to recruit fresh graduates, because its travelling costs and time would
be less than those for companies located in other states. For example, at the career
fairs held in the easily accessible Back Bay area earlier this year, companies that were
there to recruit were mostly Massachusetts-based companies. Mutual fund-related
companies, such as Investors Bank and Trust, were also there. By comparing the
costs that would have to be incur by a Massachusetts-based company (local
transportation fares, and booth fees), with those of a non-Massachusetts-based
company (inter-state transportation costs, lodging expenses, food & beverage
expenses, and booth fees) makes it clear that the Massachusetts-based company has a
cost advantage.
Moreover, since these new recruits have already been in the area for at least three
years, there is less uncertainty in remaining in Boston than relocating to another state
to work, and so they are likely to be more attracted to mutual fund job opportunities in
Boston that are not inferior to those found in other states. Hence, for similar job
openings in back office operations, not only would a Boston-based firm have a better
chance in employing a more competent individual, it need not compensate the person
for relocating to Boston.
Strong knowledge-creation
To stay at the fore, both mutual fund management and information technology
industry require not only high levels of human capital, but also a constant infusion of
new ideas and new blood. In this aspect, effective systems in advanced education,
R&D, consultancy, and other institutions involved in the perpetuation and creation of
knowledge, are extremely vital to the growth of these two industries. Massachusetts
has the highest concentration of employment related to "knowledge creation" in the
US. Included in the "knowledge creation employment" statistics are employment in
tertiary educational institutions, research and development laboratories, think tanks,
consulting firms, law firms and market research organizations (Porter, 1992).
Furthermore, Massachusetts has been ranked first among the 50 states of America in
terms of level of applied intelligence9 (Thomas, 1994).
With the existence of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the tertiary
education institute that has been the torchbearer of technological advancement for
decades, technology has almost weaved itself into the traditions of Massachusetts.
MIT has always been fervently investigating, researching, and developing new
concepts, new machines, and new technology. During World War II, its research
laboratories had developed a bewildering array of methods, systems, and devices
relating to fire control, missile guidance and navigation, metallurgy, optics,
photography, and electronics. All these discoveries and progress had contributed
significantly with to America's edge in technological warfare (Adams, 1977).
Such zeal did not end with the war. In the post-war years, the institution continued its
love-affair with technology, channeling its technological quest into other areas, such
as developing computers, biomedical instruments and methods, and catapulted the
state of Massachusetts to yet another level up the ladder of technological
sophistication. For example, Ken Olsen and Harland Anderson were both from the
Digital Computer Laboratory at MIT. They later founded Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC) and used the Whirlwind and Sage computer technologies (that
MIT has designed for the US navy and Air Force respectively) to develop their
9 Ranking is determined by the state's scoring in the following five categories: (1) proportion of college
graduates; (2) proportion of doctoral candidates; (3) number of MacArthur fellows per million
residents (1978-92); (4) patent awards; and (5)research and development funding.
interactive and interlinked computers (International Directory of Company Histories,
1988).
Proximity to these fine colleges has also allowed for some linkages to be formed
between the incubators of knowledge and research, and the mutual fund management
and information technology firms. Such relationships are often in the form of
internships, and funded research, which at many times, lead to permanent jobs at the
companies for the participating students. This has, in a way, helped Massachusetts
retain the best and the brightest, even though many were originally from other states,
or even other countries.
Strong Technology: Indigenous versus Bought
Not all technologically-advanced states or countries have the same degree of
inventiveness nor willingness to partake in extensive R&D activities. Technology can
be bought. Take Singapore, for instance. Its petrochemical sector and aerospace
industry are fairly well established and have good regional standing. However, most
of its technologies are imported, bought with some good foreign reserves 0 . Even
when the little country obviously is more technologically advanced, with regard to
these two industries, than most of its neighbours within the Asia-Pacific basin, it still
cannot be considered to be at the cutting edge of those technologies. Unless it takes
on the task of developing something significant on its own, it would still be lagging,
in terms of technological competitiveness, behind the countries from which it has
acquired the know-how. Nevertheless, Massachusetts is different. As I have shown
above, the presence of MIT ensured that Massachusetts is always at the cutting edge
of technology.
Reputed for its dedication to technological advancement, MIT has produced many
engineers who, like Ken Olsen and Harland Anderson who founded DEC, decided to
stay on and set up their companies in Massachusetts. In 1968, 0.5% of the labour
force in Massachusetts were scientists, of which 13% were in the field of Statistics,
Mathematics, & Computer Science; for the same year, scientists account for 0.4% of
New York State's labour force, and of these 13% were in the field of Statistics,
Mathematics & Computer Science (Statistical Abstract of US 1970). By 1979, the
number of engineers as a share of total number of scientists in Massachusetts was
already about 15%; New York garnered 13% for the same year and statistic for the
same year.
10 Source: Economic Development Board of Singapore; Low, Rowena. "Singapore's Aerospace
Industry" ASEAN/ Singapore Briefing Oct. 1995.
Furthermore, with software prowess, Massachusetts also has database providers that
could supply fundamental analysis databases through programmes that were more
cost-efficient and more user-friendly than competitor products. Fundamental
analysis, which is key to a complete investment strategy, helps to determine the
intrinsic value of a company (whether it is over/undervalued). Fundamental analysis
databases are electronic reservoirs of detailed corporate financial data combined with
a variety of screening tools. They allow an investment manager to analyse the
financial performance of multiple companies simultaneously, conquer intimidating
calculations to gain insight into a company's performance, and test investment
strategies before putting them into action (Wall Street Computer Review, October
1990, p.45). Such service has become increasingly important to investment-related
activities, such as mutual fund management. As the number of companies listed on
the exchange rises and investment choices sky-rocket, few portfolio managers can
visit a significant number of firms to acquire a full understanding of the investment
universe. For example, managers have expressed their preference for Market Base, a
basic database system from MP Software (Massachusetts), because not only does it
provide good coverage and timely updates for a lower cost, but it was also much
easier to use (Wall Street Computer Review, October 1990, p.50).
The mutual fund companies in Boston have benefited greatly from locating near
computer companies offering state-of-the-art technology would be Colonial Group of
Boston. The company had eliminated timesharing costs and is providing its fund
portfolio managers with flexible access to investment information from a variety of
sources through a relational database management system from DEC (Wall Street
Computer Review, February 1988, p. 116). The VAXcluster system that DEC had
installed for the Colonial Group already allows almost uninterrupted access database.
And this was during the late 1980's.
DEMAND CONDITIONS
Under the Porter framework, home demand conditions are crucial in shaping an
industry and determining its competitive advantage. This factor affects the industry in
three main ways -- the mix and character of domestic buyer demands, the size and
pattern of growth of domestic demand, and the mechanisms by which the region's
domestic preferences are transmitted to foreign markets (Porter, 1990).
In the light of the mutual fund industry, however, besides the initial spur from the
need of Boston's affluent community to preserve their wealth, home demand
conditions does not seem to have much influence on Boston's competitiveness in the
mutual fund industry. The need for an investment vehicle that is safe and preserves
wealth prompted L. Sherman Adams, Charles Learoyd, and Ashton Carr to create the
first mutual fund, which is more liquid than the traditional trust instrument and is
therefore safer, and satisfies the wealth preservation need as well. However, with the
technological sophistication in telecommunications, the borders and constraints that
once separated domestic demands from demands from other states of United States,
home demand conditions no longer wield much influence over the competitiveness of
Boston's mutual fund industry.
Demand for mutual funds is not differentiated or constrained by region. Unlike
manufacturers, geographic proximity to customers is not an asset for a mutual fund.
Whereas manufactures incur costs of transfer from "production site" to the buyer,
such as transportation fees and time, this is not much of an issue for a financial
product like mutual funds. Even during the early trading days of the first fund,
Massachusetts Investors Trust, telephone and telegraphic communication has, in a
sense, reduced the distance between two transacting parties. In today's world of
highly advanced information technology, the concept of geographic boundary for a
financial product like mutual funds, is being eroded even more quickly. With
excellent telecommunication networks in the United States, individuals and
institutions can invest in any fund that strikes their fancy by just picking up the
telephone. So even if a fund aimed at the Northeastern regional market were created,
investors in other regions of the US can buy into the fund at no greater inconvenience
or cost than those sited in the Northeast. In other words, with investors having
relatively equal access to any fund, the investment in mutual funds is driven by
national, rather than local, demand. This greatly reduces the advantages of being
geographically close to the "market" or "point of sales" for mutual fund management
companies (Moon and Siu, 1995.)
RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES
The presence of competitive, home-based suppliers of specialized components,
machinery, and services creates advantages in several ways. First, customers who are
geographically close to the suppliers often have the benefit of early access to the latest
models and newest products (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3). Second, proximity and close
working relationships with home-based suppliers enhances innovation and upgrading.
This is because there is the advantage of quick and continuous flow of information,
joint work on improvements, and mutual pressures to advance (Porter, 1990, Chapter
3). Third, proximity to each other allows better, ongoing coordination between
supplier and customer (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3).
Ancillary Industrial Synergy
Competitive information technology industry. Massachusetts strength in
technological capabilities, especially in the area of computer-related know-how, has
certainly helped hone the competitive advantage of Boston's mutual fund cluster, and
propelled its growth. It is also an area that Massachusetts has a clear advantage over
New York, as well as many other states. Massachusetts has a concentration of
computer and data processing services industry" that is slightly over twice as large as
the national average; on the other hand, the concentration this industry in New York
is a mere 90% of the national average concentration.12 The nature of the mutual fund
business involves a lot of information that needs to be processed in a timely fashion.
Customer account changes, up-to-date prices of stocks, bonds, and bills, and
fundamental data are just some of the information that a management company needs
to deal with on a typical day. In addition, it has to continue to innovate and create
new products and investment features.
In order to see more clearly how advanced information technology can help the
mutual fund management industry, consider the legal front. The mutual fund industry
is the most highly regulated sector of the financial services industry (Fink, 1996).
Prior to the 1996 legislation that abolished state regulation of the mutual fund
industry, different state regulations added to the confusion and made legal compliance
a nightmare.13  Faced with so many unique state regulations, specially tailored
software programmes would definitely help management companies to sort through,
with higher efficiency and productivity, the highly complex mesh of legal compliance
involved in the sale of every single fund that it sets up.
From the perspective of introducing creative mutual funds and investment features,
management companies would also enjoy room for creativity. This is often made
possible only by the operational and analytical capacity boost from custom-made
computer software programmes that are designed to handle the increasing complexity
of portfolio analysis and management. Given the make or break nature of the
financial market, the timely processing and dissemination of information is crucial to
the management companies. Managers need to obtain information, process it and
make their investment decisions within the shortest time possible. A buy or sell order
submitted to the broker a moment later can mean a difference in thousands and
millions of dollars. This is especially true in today's financial market in which state-
of-the-art telecommunication infrastructure allows transactions to be made
internationally, 24 hours a day.
Telecommunication infrastructure accessibility for management companies, at least in
the United States, is more or less the same, regardless of their location. However, this
does not apply to technology (Moon & Siu, 1995). Management companies which
are geographically close to a strong information technology industry, have an
advantage over those that are not. Being close and therefore, have ready access, to
" SIC code 737 : Computer Programming, Data Processing, and Other Computer Related Services.
(Executive Office of the President Office of Management & Budget, Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, 1987)
12 Couny Business Patterns, 1994/95
13 Interview with Tammy Reed, a lawyer at the Investment Company Institute (by telephone).
such hardware and software expertise, management companies have a better
knowledge of which is the more competent firm and can forge a cooperative
relationship with the computer industry more easily.
Geographic proximity allows for more frequent consultations regarding new
technological breakthrough, system maintenance or upgrade, which in turn, gives the
management company much greater freedom in the creation of innovative investment
products and customer services. Without doubt, innovation, ingenuity and acute
foresight are the makings of a successful management company. Should a "virus" get
into the company's network or programme, being geographically closer to these
experts also ensures a speedier rectification of the problem, which could save yet
more dollars. Computer technology, which allows all the above to be done with
relative ease, accuracy, and less manpower, were definitely appreciated. In 1992, the
mutual fund industry bought a total of US$3091 computer and a computer related
goods and services. As a share of total expenditure of the mutual fund industry, this
represents more than a six-fold increase over what it had bought back in 1988.14 The
increasing reliance of the industry on computer technology is clear.
From the perspective of the computer industry, having a major mutual fund industrial
cluster nearby provides the it with a ready market with high rewards. Striving to get
contracted by, or entering a partnership with, the company offering the highest
rewards (both in terms of immediate monetary payoff and long-term earning
potential), firms within this technological sector are forced to be highly competitive
operations. Competition fires up the zeal of R&D activities and unleashes the powers
of innovativeness, which together have proven to have transformed Boston into a
mighty dynamo in both mutual fund and applied investment technology industries.
And Boston has remained, for all these years, at the fore of both industries.
As an illustration to show how highly rewarding the ingenious use of technology can
be for a mutual fund management company, consider the case of Boston-based
Fidelity. Fidelity had begun, ahead of most other investment companies and banks, to
invest heavily in technology in the late 1960s. By the 1990s, the company was
pumping over $150 million a year in the technology realm. As a result, Fidelity was
at the cutting edge of providing technology-based customer services, and has become
the largest mutual fund management company today. Some of the fruits of Fidelity's
technological investment and research development include the interactive,
automated-service telephone system in 1983, and the upgrading of the phone
answering system to the point where it could handle 672 calls simultaneously on its
automated toll-free lines, while a master console in Boston routed calls to the first
available operator around the country. These creative services, made possible by
14 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the United States, 1988 and 1992. In 1988, expenditure on
computer and computer related goods was 2.7% of the mutual fund industry's total output; in 1992, this
figure rose to 20.9%.
technology, have contributed significantly in bringing customers all over the nation
closer to Fidelity ( International Directory of Company Histories Vol. II, 1988).
Furthermore, the establishment of the American Research & Development
Corporation (ARD) in the mid-1946 helped to power the spirit of technological
innovation. ARD was a publicly owned investment company formed to supply
venture capital to new research-based enterprises engaged in inventing new peace-
time uses for technology that had been used during the war. Its existence was
important in supporting the growth of technological industries in Boston. At that
time, most of Boston's financial resources locked in investment trusts, mutual funds,
and insurance companies, which were too conservative to invest in such risky projects
(Adams, 1977). Without the support from ARD, many of the technology-based firms,
which include Digital Equipment Corporation, Tracerlab, Incorporated and High
Voltage Engineering Company, would not have come to be due to the lack of start-up
capital. Lacking practical economic value other than wartime use would have
seriously dampened the earnest of Massachusetts pursuit of technological
advancement.
Located in Maynard, Massachusetts, the beneficiary of ARD, Digital Equipment
Corporation is now a renowned worldwide supplier of networked computer systems,
software, and services. Digital is best known for introducing the minicomputer to the
information processing industry (International Directory of Company Histories,
1988). When Digital was first established, the only commercially available
computers were million-dollar mainframes from manufacturers such as IBM, Univac,
and Boroughs. The company introduced its first computer, the PDP-1, in 1960. The
system came with a cathode-ray tube so that the user knows what was being entered
and received from the central processing unit (International Directory of Company
Histories, 1988). In terms of size, the system was about the size of a refrigerator, but
mainframe computers of those days were around the size of a room. In terms of cost,
it was almost ten times cheaper than its contemporary competitor products
(International Directory of Company Histories, 1988). This had brought computers
closer to non-computer-specialist users, such as mutual fund management companies.
FIRM STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND RIVALRY
Porter (1990) posits that competitiveness grows out of a context that supports
innovation, through policies and norms that encourage sustained investment in skills,
capabilities and physical assets. Local rivalry and competition spurs companies to
innovate and improve their capabilities to lower costs, enhance quality, and invent
new products and processes (Porter, 1990, Chapter 3).
In the context of the mutual fund industry, the high concentration of mutual fund
management firms simultaneously provides the impetus for innovation, and
consolidates mutual interests of firms (Moon & Siu, 1995). As Boston has a greater
concentration of mutual fund interests than any other city, this factor could have
worked to keep the mutual fund industry in Boston highly competitive, and therefore,
attractive for new firms to locate in the Boston industry and enjoy the positive spill-
over effects.
As the stringent Glass-Steagall Act disintegrates, and deregulation of the financial
sector gathers momentum, legal barriers of entry into the sphere of mutual fund
business are decreasing 0 . Consequently, competition faced by the mutual fund
management companies has been increasing steadily. For example, insurance
companies, like John Hancock, hopped onto the mutual funds bandwagon during the
1960s; brokerage firms, such as Merrill Lynch, entered the mutual funds business
during the 1970s; and, when finally permitted by a relaxed legal structure, banks, like
State Street Bank & Trust Co., took interests in mutual fund management. With an
explosion in the number of mutual funds entering the market, management companies
face intense competitive pressure to create new investment features and fund types in
order to preserve their competitiveness. The need to fend off other competing
financial services in their pursuit of investment capital also helps to keep management
companies honed and nimble. In fact, mutual fund companies are increasingly
competing on national grounds, which certainly intensifies the fight. For example,
consider the "invention" of the money market mutual fund in the 1970 by Reserve
Management Co. of New York. Two years later, Benham Management Corporation
of California joined in with its introduction of Capital Preservation Fund. By 1976,
these two companies had had to share the pie with many other companies.
Companies are therefore always on their toes.
Higher concentration of firms engaged in the similar activities also consolidates
interests. Underwriters and brokers are likely to make Boston their first stop for their
routine "dog and pony" shows because given the high concentration of mutual fund
management companies, they would be able to present and sell their products more
efficiently. So firms in Boston are likely to be the first to learn of the newest and best
products or securities.
15 Interview with John Rea, economist at the Investment Company Institute (via telephone).
CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, AND CHANCE
In this chapter, I shall be examining the role of government policies on the
development of the Boston mutual fund industry. I shall also show the importance of
history in the success of the Boston mutual fund industry and that it cannot be left out
of the diamond when considering the mutual fund industry.
Porter (1990) suggests that governments have the power to manipulate, and enhance
or hurt the region's competitive advantage in the a cluster. In the interest of the
economy, the government should implement the correct mix of policies to reinforce
the region's competitive advantage, and the diamond should be able to provide the
government with the policy analysis guidance that it would need. It the responsibility
of the government to create the basic inputs, such as modern infrastructure, educated
human resources, sufficient supply of investable capital, and a technological base
(Porter, 1990). Furthermore, it should direct its policies in such a way as to create a
conducive climate for innovation and upgrading (Porter, 1990). The government
should also shoulder the task of reinforcing existing local clusters. Finally, Porter
(1990) postulates that when a cluster has yet to be formed, the government can
encourage or hasten its formation by challenging the target industries (1990).
As for chance or historical events, Porter (1990) acknowledges the role that they play
in creating and shaping the determinants of regional competitive advantage. He
suggests that history works on the four determinants through the influence of culture
which is hard for competitors to mimic. For chance events, he maintains that they are
important in that they cause some form of discontinuity which allow shifts in
competitive position to take place. Some examples that Porter gives include acts of
pure invention, discontinuities in input costs (e.g., oil shocks), and major
technological discontinuities (e.g., biotechnology).
Nonetheless, he maintains that the role of government and the determinants of
competitive advantage have a larger influence in sharpening a region's competitive
edge (Porter, 1990). If neither the region's government nor the region take the
necessary steps to embrace a golden opportunity that it "chanced upon", it would not
help the region gain competitiveness in that industry. The reason he gave for this is
that industrial innovation is not all random (Porter, 1990).
Although Porter (1990) and Porter (1998) did not elaborate much on the historical
influence on a financial services industry, I shall show how it is not possible to ignore
the variable when analysing the mutual fund industry, or the financial services
industry, for that matter.
GOVERNMENT
As I shall illustrate below, government policies do not offer adequate explanation for
the continued clustering and dominance of the Boston mutual fund industry. The
initial enactment of the Massachusetts Business Trust could have provided the
legislative alchemy for management companies in Massachusetts to gain competitive
advantage and hence, served as an attractive force to pull new management firms to
locate in the state. However, once other states emulated, the Massachusetts Business
Trust is no longer the competitive asset it once was. As for the tax environment, it
was not conducive for mutual fund industry prior to 1996, due to an unfavourable tax
apportionment formula and the choice of using "source" test over "destination" test in
determining state-taxable corporate income.
State regulatory and legislative environment. Prior to the enactment of the 1996
National Securities Markets Improvement Act, Tammy Reed, who is a lawyer dealing
with "Blue Skies" Laws at the Investment Company Institute, pointed that this state
was actually rather notorious for its cumbersome state regulations which were very
fickle, changing every now and then. Indeed, such excessive unique rules and
uncertainly did frustrate the management companies. Also, the call for compliance
analysis raised the administrative and management costs of mutual funds. But, it was
not a problem that could be solved by relocation of the management companies. It
was a problem that emerged from the destination, not origin, of sales.
Regarding this problem with state regulation, Matthew Fink, President of the
Investment Company Institute dubbed the pre-1996 system "a crazy quilt of
inconsistent and conflicting regulation." Regulatory environments varied not only
from state to state, but also year by year, and, often, fund by fund (Fink, 1996). In
fact, it is possible for two different mutual funds, even within the same fund complex,
to be subjected to very different treatment by the same state during the same period in
time [Table 5]! Because sales of mutual funds have more of a national, rather than a
regional, characteristic, relocation to a "good" state like Wyoming would not ease the
pains of such state regulatory compliance for mutual fund management companies.
Besides, Massachusetts was not the only state guilty of such legislative frivolity. And
this does not elucidate the effect of government policies on competitiveness and
agglomeration, as in the light of Porter's "cluster" theory.
Table 5 An Example of the Divergent State Regulatory Systems (pre-1996)
Regulatory Conditions States
Exemption for "blue-chip" investment companies Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Utah
Exemption for "blue-chip" investment companies and active commenting New Jersey
of registration statements of investment companies that do not claim the
exemption.
Exemption for "blue-chip" investment companies, active commenting on San Diego
registration statements of investment companies that do not claim the
exemption, and imposition of inconsistent substantive limitations on
investment companies by rule.
Exemption for "blue-chip" investment companies but filing of advertising West Virginia
by investment companies that do not claim the exemption is required.
Does not review advertising.
Exemption for all investment companies from registration upon the filing Wyoming
of a notice.
Exemption for all investment companies from registration (no notice Hawaii
required).
No requirement for registration of securities, including securities issued New York, Washington DC
by investment companies.
Exemption from registration for all securities registered under 1933 Act. Georgia, Louisiana
Registration of investment companies required but exempts investment Wisconsin
company offerings from review.
Registration of investment company offerings required, but generally do Conneticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
not review registration statements or review them in a manner consistent Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
with federal law and do no require filing of advertising. Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahama, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
Registration of investment company offerings required. Imposes Washington State
inconsistent substantive limitations on investment companies by rule, but
generally does not review registration statements or reviews them in a
manner consistent with federal law.
Filing of registration statements and advertising required, but does not Indiana
actively review registration statements or advertising.
Registration of investment company offerings required. Occasionally issue Alaska, Montana
inconsistent comments, but do not require filing of advertising.
Registration statements actively reviewed and frequently issue Arizona, Maryland, Minnesota
inconsistent comments. Filing of advertising not required
Registration statements actively reviewed and inconsistent comments are Arkansas, Missouri, Ohio
frequently issued. Imposes inconsistent substantive limitations by rule,
but do not require filing of advertising.
Filing of registration statements and advertising required. Actively Massachusetts
reviews registration statements but not advertising.
Filing of registration statements and advertising required. Actively California, Texas
reviews registration statements but not advertising. Imposes inconsistent
substantive limitations by rule.
Filing of registration statements and advertising required. Actively Vermont
reviews both.
Source: Fink Matthew. "Mutual Fund Regulation: Forging a New Federal and State Partnership" Investment
Company Institute Perspective Vol. 2 No.1 (Jan 1996)
Business Trust Code. Massachusetts is the first state to have a trust code -- the
Massachusetts Trust Code 16. As mentioned before, a mutual fund can either be
organized as a business trust, or a corporation. In general, being organized as a
business trust offers a more flexible form of organization, because the trust code
under which a business trust is governed, may have provisions often not permitted
under a state's corporate laws. A corporation, on the other hand, not only has to abide
by the terms of its bylaws, but also have to comply with the guidelines of its
domiciliary state's corporate statutes. For instance, a business trust has the right to
issue an unlimited number of shares without the need for further shareholder
approval. But, a corporation would have to obtain shareholder approval in order to
increase its capital.
The existence of the Massachusetts Trust Code has made it a lot easier for
management companies to set up a fund. Furthermore, it prevents double-taxation of
the management company which is already subject to corporate income taxation.
Without the provision that exempts mutual funds from state taxation of income,
franchise or stock issuance, mutual funds would be taxed because they are regarded as
separate legal entities from the management company that established them.
However, state taxation of mutual funds, which are not more than mere paper entities,
simply translates to state taxation of the management company, in addition to
whatever state taxes the company is already liable for. With the nightmarish web of
legal compliance that management companies have to work through in selling their
funds, management companies would certainly have welcomed a substantial
reduction in redtape in fund formation. Therefore, it is understandable why many
mutual funds are incorporated in Massachusetts.
Now, Delaware and Maryland also have favourable business trust statutes and
corporation law for mutual fund management companies, respectively. Maryland's
corporate statute offers both the flexibility of a business trust and the limited liability
of corporate form. Another state with a business trust statute that rivals
Massachusetts' is Minnesota. Minnesota's business trust statute grants limited
liability of shareholders and trustees, a provision not present in Massachusetts' trust
code; the former also mirrors the latter in eliminating the need for annual meeting of
shareholders, and its tax laws embody the Regulated Investment Company (RIC)17
16 Source: Interview with Peter Fortune, Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
17 A RIC is a company registered under the Investment Company Act, and it derives at least 90% of its
gross income from dividends, interest, discount, payments with respect to securities loans, gains from
the sale or disposition of stocks or securities, and other related "investments income", and no more than
30% of gross income can come from the sale of securities held less than three months. In addition, a
RIC should not hold securities of any one issuer or of any two or more issuer if they are substantially
identical (excluding government securities), that exceeds 25% of asset value. It would have to
distribute at least 90% of its taxable income to shareholders in order to qualify for tax exemption.
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code'. (Moon and Siu, 1995). Although
Delaware and Maryland are major competitors for mutual fund incorporation,
Massachusetts still dominates as the place where most funds are incorporated.
Massachusetts Trust Code has been an edge over other states in simplifying the
process of fund formation. But with the emergence of competing states that have
come up with similar statutes that are just as appealing to management companies,
this should be an advantage of yesteryears. However, Massachusetts has not waned in
its dominance in the business of mutual funds. It is, once again, the mystic powers of
history.
Taxation. An individual living in Boston is taxed rather heavily relative to
counterparts in cities such as Chicago or Minneapolis. This is especially so when the
focus is narrowed down to the high-income category in which portfolio managers
would fall under.
In order to analyse the full effect of taxes, Tannenwald (1994) used the
"representative household" approach to compare the tax burden on representative
high-income families of four residing in various cities. Taxes that are taken into
account in such an analysis include state and local personal income taxes, property
taxes, general sales taxes, motor fuel taxes, motor registration fees, and motor vehicle
excise taxes (Tannenwald, 1994). The study also took into consideration of the
manner in which the burden of state and local personal income taxes and property
taxes is lightened by their deductibility from federal taxable income (Tannenwald,
1994). Results show that the representative high-income household residing in
Boston had a higher state and local tax burden relative to its counterparts in most of
the other cities. With the household's tax burden in Boston at about 8% of income,
the city ranked 13th (out of 51 cities) in the study. Nevertheless, it still holds an
advantage over New York City, which was ranked as the second highest in the same
study (Tannenwald, 1994).
Regarding corporate taxation of the mutual fund industry, however, Robert
Tannenwald, Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston indicated that
pre-1996 Massachusetts was one of the states that posed the highest tax burden. This
was due to the way that Massachusetts structured its "apportionment" formula, which
is used to determine its fair share of the taxable corporate income of a multistate
corporation, the selection of using a source test 19, and having high property tax rates..
18 Source: Interview with John Rea, Economist at the Investment Company Institute. Mutual fund
management companies and mutual funds do not show the same pattern of locational distribution. A
management company based in New York might incorporate a new fund that it has set up in
Massachusetts.
19 When a source test is used, then sales "done" or "performed" in Massachusetts, regardless of where
customers reside, would be regarded as in-state sales income.
In most states, the apportionment factors are the state's shares of the firm's total
payroll, property, and sales.
Until 1996, Massachusetts had imposed a source-test model (otherwise known as
"throwback" practice) on the mutual fund industry. As discussed earlier, sales of
funds are rarely, if not never, limited to the domicile state of the management
companies. Consequently, most of the profits are considered in-state sales income
that are subjected to Massachusetts taxation.
The state's tax competitiveness for the mutual fund industry slipped when several
states -- Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Washington -- adopted
the destination test model. Under this model, only sales to the residents of the firm's
domiciliary state are subject to taxation by that state. Furthermore, Massachusetts has
double-weighted the sales component, which further magnified the ill-effects of
distortion:
PayrollMA+ PropertVMA + 2 x Sales MA
(Taxable income)MA = PayrollTOTA Property OTAL Sales TOTAL
4
This effect is especially acute when sales of mutual funds sky-rocketed over 100
times the amount in the early 1970s. Aside from the unfavourable tax treatment of
corporate income taxes, property taxes in Massachusetts and for that matter, Boston,
20
are also among the nation's highest . It is not surprising how much this would
concern a mutual fund management company. Take Fidelity for instance. It housed
its Fidelity Capital Markets in Boston's World Trade Centre on a 35,000-square-foot
trading floor, which is the largest in the Northeast (International Directory of
Company Histories Vol II, 1988). It also purchased the property in Marlborough,
Massachusetts, where one of its regional operations centre is located. In addition to
its mainstream financial investments, this financial giant also has considerable real
estate interests (not to mention its publishing concerns, transportation service, and a
chain of art galleries.) The property tax component was definitely not small.
Although the tax burden in Boston that an individual (in the high-income bracket) has
to bear is relatively greater than cities like Chicago and Minneapolis, it is still
comparatively less than that in New York City. Nonetheless, in terms of corporate
tax for the mutual fund industry, Massachusetts has been the one of the heaviest
taxing states prior to 1996. After the 1996 lobbying by the mutual fund companies,
however, the state has whittled the taxation on the industry to a bare minimum.
Hence, the tax environment of Boston for the mutual fund industry only became
conducive after 1996. Therefore, favourable tax policies are not among the reasons
for mutual fund management companies' decisions to locate in Boston prior to 1996.
20 Interview with Robert Tannenwald, Senior Economist at Boston Federal Bank of Reserve.
HISTORY
In the following, I provide the evidence of how historical events and accidents are
more than just fleeting opportunities that would disappear if there were not a
conscious effort to take chance to create the determinants of competitive advantage
for the mutual fund industry in Boston. It works through the nature of the business.
Success of a mutual fund management company depends heavily on its reputation,
which is really a function of the trust and credibility that it has earned. And these can
be had through repeated transactions and building a record of performance over time.
Should history be left out, or given less weight in the analysis of the Boston mutual
fund industry, there seems to be many missing pieces to the whole picture. High level
of attainment in technological deepening and the presence of excellent educational
facilities are certainly conducive to the development of the mutual fund management
industry in Boston. Even as the nation's financial centre, New York lags behind
Boston in technological innovation and the magnitude of concentration of superb
educational institutions. The synergy created by the harmonious interaction of these
industries, and the never-ending quest for knowledge, in Boston is key to fostering
this city into the hub of mutual fund management. But this synergy did not come
about overnight. Nor could it explain entirely why the mutual fund industrial cluster
did not shift to New York, which is, afterall, the centre of the nation's financial
activities.
The role of history in the development of the Boston mutual fund cluster.
One thing is for sure -- fund management requires a lot of savvy21 . While good
education can certainly enhance one's knowledge and skills, it is doubtful that the
classroom is where one acquire all the shrewdness and canny that is often associated
with mercantile and financial professionals. It is more likely to be the influence of
society and family. And the structure of society is dependent on its past, its history.
Boston had been a trading hub between the Old World and the New World since the
early days of American Settlement. As a Seaboard Colony, Boston's extensive trade
with England during the seventeenth century dealt with almost everything from staple
crops to servants and slaves. It was also the centre of America's trade with China
(Adams, 1977). This was largely an outcome due to insufficient arable land in
Massachusetts for large-scale agriculture, that makes it a lesser competitor than
Virginia, Maryland and the Carolinas, and crushed the Puritan dream of devout
agragian life. Instead, Boston became a bustling seafaring and trading town (Adams,
1977).
21 Interviews with Peter Fortune and Robert Tannenwald, both Senior Economists at Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, emphasized this point.
Wherever there is trade, there is finance. Wherever there is trade, there is a need for a
medium of exchange, just as there is a need to store this medium of exchange and/or
convert it into other forms of assets. It is no surprise that Massachusetts was one of
the first states to establish a bank, issue its own colonial mint, and to circulate paper
currency (Shultz and Caine, 1937.) Where there is trade, there is always bargaining,
as there is the risk of falling prey to dishonest conduct. Honed by the ways of trade,
Boston's merchants were definitely more "street-smart" than the simple folks living in
the agrarian states. Children of these sharp men of commerce were likely to be raised
and taught in such a manner that they too became more shrewd than their
contemporaries.
Furthermore, the early accumulation of capital in Boston, as well as New York and
Philadelphia, sowed the seeds of financial development and capital-market formation.
During the early years, most private fortunes were not liquid investments but of
property. Start-up capital for commercial or industrial ventures through
accumulations from individual frugality. Later during the eighteenth century,
corporations over the nation started to tap the growing pool of liquid capital, inducing
the early formation of capital markets in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. (Shultz
and Caine, 1937).
By the late nineteenth century, 218 of the 277 bankers and brokers in New England
were domiciled in Boston. They mostly belonged to what we know as security houses
today. Some of these security houses have been in operation since 1850s, but most of
them started in 1870s. Examples of such security houses are Lee, Higginson &
Company, and Peabody & Company. Several commercial banks were also partaking
in underwriting activities as well, and these include Old Colony Trust Co. (Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1973). This shows that Boston has had a long exposure to
the world of finance and hint at its level of sophistication.
Savvy and a tradition in trade and finance are Boston's advantages over other states
that were traditionally agrarian (e.g., California). Once the comparison is struck
between Boston and New York City, however, the two cities seemed tied in their
scores for these two factors. Furthermore, since the first mutual fund was launched in
1924 in Boston, a time when New York has already dominated as the nation's
financial centre, it is interesting to ponder why the mutual fund industry did not shift
or form a cluster there instead. New York already has a cluster of financial services
industry which would ideologically be conducive to the development of the cluster of
mutual fund industry. But the mutual fund industry persisted in its place of origin
instead [Figure 7]. New Yorkers, by any measure, were no less savvy than the
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Bostonians. In terms of wealth, New York was no less endowed than Boston. Boston
had the Forbes, the Cabots, and the Higginsons; New York had the Vanderbilts, the
Goulds, and the Morgans. Nevertheless, a closer scrutiny of the mutual fund
management business would shed some light on this enigma.
A tradition in money management. Boston has had a long history in money
management and preservation of wealth. It is the first place where the concept of
institutionalized trust management was conceived. Bostonian institutions have the
reputation of knowing how to manage money for others, and do it well. Mutual funds
were borne of the traditional concept of trusts. As such, they traditionally require a
more conservative approach than the usual stock market investment. On the other
hand, the speculative spirit of Wall Street did not agree with the early principles of a
mutual fund industry. The flamboyant ways of New York were too risky. Wall Street
was oft associated with risky acts like financial pyramiding (a game of gaining
maximum control over a certain company with minimum cash., through holding
companies) and "watering down of stocks" (diluting the value of a stock) (Allen,
1935).
Before the existence of trust institutions, Bostonians often put the care of their money
in the hands of others. Travelling sea captains and traders might have a successful
merchant manage their investments for them; a wealthy man might, in his will, put his
estate in his trusted friend's care on behalf of his less enterprising beneficiaries. In
the first half of the nineteenth century, an attempt to raise sufficient funds for
Massachusetts General Hospital led to the institutionalization of trusteeship (Adams,
1977). The main idea behind a trust was to provide a safe and steady income for its
beneficiary without dipping into the principal amount. The investments made with
the entrusted funds were very conservative, since the aim was safe and steady, and
keeping "always in view the safety of the Capital, rather than the greatness of the
income." This was particularly appealing to the rich. Not only was the fee on income
less than generally charged by private trustees, but by turning funds over to an
institution rather than an individual, they were able to secure the kind of long-term
perpetuity so desired in planning for the welfare of their unborn descendants (Adams,
1977).
The mutual fund management industry has also received a historical boost from the
demand-side of the equation -- the demand for trusts and trust-like investment
instruments. The creation of wealth in Boston was tremendous. Boston had garnered
huge rewards first as a tradepost, then from the textile business and later, railways
(Adams, 1977). Given its early start, Boston was the first American city to offer a
considerable number of its citizens the chance to grow rich (Adams, 1977). Similarly,
it was also the first to become preoccupied with conserving the large amounts of
money that its people had made. Wealthy men who doubted their sons' mettle or
worry that a good-for-nothing prodigy might squander the family wealth away, started
to squirrel away large amounts of Boston's wealth from productive enterprise into
trusts (Adams, 1977). Here we see that, in the very beginning, home demand did help
to kick-start the industry.
The first in business. Another historical aspect to consider is simply being the place
where the first mutual fund was established. There is always an intrigue associated
with being the first, be it the first college in the US, the first man to land on the moon,
or the first state to have a subway system or a mutual fund. In our awe and admiration
for the cleverness and ingenuity behind the innovation, we have attached a certain
value to being a groundbreaker or trailblazer. This is probably why pioneers always
seem to have more prestige, legitimacy, credibility, and of course, reputation. As I
have mentioned earlier, mutual fund investments involve people's savings. And the
government does not provide the Federal Deposit Insurance Cover (FDIC) for mutual
fund investment, as it does for savings banks. Therefore, prestige, legitimacy,
credibility, and reputation are essential to making a mutual fund business successful.
Such attractive features might also have been one of the forces that drew new
management companies to locate in Boston, because they too want to share such a
desirable image that only time and performance can buy.
As the groundbreaker of the mutual fund management industry, the Massachusetts
Investors Trust was the one to bear the risks and uncertainties. Its success was proof
that mutual fund business in Boston was a "tried and tested territory" and served as
the seedbed for the growth of new companies. For example, Philip L.Carret, the
founder of the Pioneer Fund, was a feature writer at Clarence Barron in 1924. He had
overheard the conversations between his editor, Herb Cole, and Sherman Adams, who
was seeking the former's opinion on starting a fund -- Massachusetts Investors Trust.
Having paid closed attention to the discussions and tracked the progress of the
Massachusetts Investors Trust, he ventured into the business of mutual funds in 1926
(Griffeth, 1995).
It was also the investment firms in Boston that were the first to jump onto the mutual
fund bandwagon. This is probably because these firms' operations were the closest in
nature to that of mutual fund management. Years of experience dealing with trusts
was a springboard for Boston's financial sector to jump onto the mutual fund
bandwagon. State Street already had most of the knowledge, skills, and
organizational structures required to handle trusts. It did not have to go through a
steep learning curve to adapt to mutual funds. It just needed some adjustments to
accommodate the few new features that mutual funds differ from trusts. Also, they
were located closest to the centre of activity and were therefore, in the best position to
gather first-hand information or investor feedback about the business. Scudder,
Stevens & Clark, an investment firm in Boston that has been in operation since 1919,
launched its first fund in 1928, just four years after Massachusetts Investors Trust2 2 .
22 Source: Scudder Investor Services, Inc. (Website)
Cromwell & Cabot's Boston money management arm organized Fidelity Shares in
1930. Edward C. Johnson 1I, who was the president of Fidelity Shares at that time,
allowed the contract of the fund with its parent company to expire and created Fidelity
Management & Research Company (FMR Corp.) to be its advisor.
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for fund managers to leave the company that they
were working and strike it out on their own. The reasons are varied. For some, it is
because they had a less than pleasant relationship with their colleagues. For some, it
is because they felt that they have hit the glass ceiling in the management company.
And there is a tendency for these people to remain in Boston. For example, Kenneth
Heebner left Loomis Sayles, a major mutual fund management company in Boston,
and founded the Capital Growth Management (CGM) in 1990 in Boston (Griffeth,
1995). As companies beget companies, the pioneers have served as an incubator to
spawn the growth of the mutual fund industry in Boston, to the extent that the city has
become very specialized in the area, and eventually resulting in a mutual fund cluster
in the very place the first fund was founded.
Strength in numbers. The security and clout that an industry has just from being big
is an attraction for new firms to locate in Boston, where there is already a larger
"mass") of mutual fund activities. Having an early start in the mutual funds, the
Boston mutual fund industry grows ahead of other competing states. And size
matters. A new mutual fund management firm would probably choose to locate in
Boston, where the industry is big, over a place like South Carolina, where the industry
is significantly smaller than that in Boston. The bigger the industry, the better
investors assume it to be; the better the business, the more attention it gets from the
"suppliers" and other related concerns, and the higher the priorities given to it. It is a
self-perpetuating phenomena. The reasons for this are simple.
First, higher concentration of firms engaged in the similar activities consolidates
interests and reduces costs. Underwriters and brokers are likely to make Boston their
first stop for their routine "dog and pony" shows because given the high concentration
of mutual fund management companies, they would be able to present and sell their
products more efficiently. So firms in Boston are likely to be the first to learn of the
newest and best products or securities. Second, there is strength in numbers.
Although firms usually do not agglomerate because they want to lobby for favours,
but rather, it is rational to do so for it offers a sense of security. If there were large
enough numbers, the government might have second-thoughts before imposing, say, a
tax-increase on that particular industry, because it is wary of the magnitude of and the
form that possible opposition to the policy might take. In this way, a large industry
has clout and is capable of keeping certain unfavourable policies at bay. If, however,
the government indeed, in its own folly, imposes some undesirable policies on the
industry, or if there is some form of legislative improvement that the industry wants,
there is enough leverage for the industry to lobby for their demands. For example, the
mutual fund industry managed to sway the Massachusetts state government to change
the tax apportionment formula and switch to a destination test, and greatly reduce the
industry's tax burden. This was because the industry accounts for a considerable
share of the state's employment and wages. The threat to move their operational base
to Rhode Island would have meant a huge loss of tax revenues for the Massachusetts
23
government
23 Interview with Robert Tannenwald, Senior Economist at Boston Federal Bank of Reserve.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Porter's "cluster" theory is quite appropriate to apply to the mutual fund industry.
First, as an answer to a question that I have raised earlier on, although the model is
able to explain the factors behind industrial agglomeration and clustering, I feel that it
services the purpose of identifying regional competitive advantages and disadvantages
of clusters better (for which it was built initially).
Nonetheless, it still provides a systematic analytical guide as to how one might bisect
and examine the financial services industry (I am extrapolating from "mutual fund
industry"), which is a very different beast from the manufacturing industry. This is
because the products are metaphysical and can take on almost infinite forms; through
financial alchemy, new and innovative products are created via different combinations
and permutations of both primary (e.g., stocks, bonds) and secondary (derivatives,
which are themselves assembled from the primary financial products) products. The
linkages and contractual relationship among different sub-sectors of the financial
services industry would be a nightmare to ramify without the help of the "cluster"
model.
By constraining the "demand conditions" to home buyer demand, the theory failed to
account for the non-regional characteristics of customers of export-oriented financial
products. For a sub-sector like mutual funds industry, or brokerage industry, which is
more export-oriented, it is not too clear how home demand conditions would
influence or boost the competitive advantage of the mutual fund industry. With the
advanced information technology, the borders and regional constraints that segregates
the customer base are not entirely obvious. But for other sectors of the financial
services industry, like consumer banking, home demand conditions might have a
more perceptible effect on stimulating the banking sector to respond to local
consumer needs, innovate, and lead the market. Nonetheless, this shows that the
cluster theory is not without flaws when applied to the financial services industry.
To account for export-oriented financial sub-sectors' markets, I would suggest that
they are determined by investor-type/investment purposes instead. Different products
carry with it different characteristics. In this case, the mutual fund is traditionally a
more conservative form of investment, although is taking on more varied forms and
different degrees of risk tolerance. By identifying such properties, rather than just
home demand conditions, one would be able to identify the type of
investors/customers the product is targeting. This then serves as a guide to examine
the "style" of investment that a place is associated with (i.e., high risk/high return, or
conservative, or "middle-of-the-road"). This probably explained why the mutual fund
industry did not grow quite as big in New York City, which is the nation's financial
hub, as it did in Boston.
Financial services depend a lot on credibility, trust, prestige, and reputation to
succeed. And such properties may only be built over time. Therefore, I propose that
the model would be able to explain financial services agglomeration better if the
factor history and chance were added as an element within the diamond, or each
element were analysed in a historical fashion. The importance of credibility and
reputation is due to the fact that these products do not have FDIC-coverage, and they
invariably involve investor capital.
Second, do we really need the cluster to compete? It depends on the industrial
structure. For an industry like the mutual fund industry, which is very top-heavy (the
two largest regional concentrations -- Boston and New York City -- already accounts
for almost half of the total net assets held), a cluster is definitely a must. For other
industries that are not this extreme, I would suggest that it is not a must for industrial
competitiveness. There are several degree of competitiveness. Clusters are
associated with the cutting-edge type of competitiveness. But there is also the
mediocre type of competitiveness. For this, whether a cluster is required for
competitiveness, I would say it depends on the structure of the industry.
Third, the importance of history in the development of the financial services industry
suggests serious rethinking of Porter's (1990) argument creation of a cluster is
possible. Porter (1990) advanced that by removing obstacles and constraints to
productivity growth through correct implementation of policies, the government can
create a diamond of competitiveness, as well as a cluster. But does that mean the
government is helpless if its region does not have the rich historical past in trade and
finance? Apparently not.
Finally, we come to the policy implications of this study. Although it is unlikely that
governments can just emulate and create an existing cluster (of similar
configuration/composition of industries in a cluster located in another region),
governments can create new types of clusters. The point is to observe industrial
development trends. The financial services industry today is showing a trend towards
financial mergers (e.g., Chase and Traveler's Group) and eventual one-stop shopping
type of financial centres. As such trends unfold, some imbalance in the system would
give rise to some form of unsatisfied customer needs and demands. A government
that wants to carve out a "cluster-niche" should therefore be always alert and
anticipatory to the changes around it. This implies that the government should start
by investing in basic factors of production, as well as certain advanced factors of
production. This would provide the supporting base on which it can strengthen its
advanced factors of production. With today's technological advancement and quick
pace of change, today's advanced or specialized factors of production would be
tomorrow's basic or generic inputs for competition. Only with the "groundwork" laid,
can the government be nimble enough to pounce upon the opportunity when it comes
and form a new form of "cluster". Not only would this grant it competitiveness, but it
also gives the region the so-called "early-mover advantages".
Furthermore, the region can partake in what I call, technological leap-frogging. To
catapult itself faster and further up the competitive advantage ladder, today's world
allows for regions to buy technology and not have to endure the slow process of
technological development from the very basics. But in order to remain competitive
or become even more competitive, the government should, at the same time, invest in
knowledge-creation (e.g., recruit more professors and lecturers from good
universities, or form joint-ventures with these leading institutions to set up learning
facilities at home), and invest more in Research & Development (R&D). All these
actions are to improve the factors of production of the region.
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